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DEVELOPMENTS
Stopping Drug Traffic On The High Seas:
Jurisdiction Over Stateless Vessels Under
21 U.S.C. § 955a
I. INTRODUCTION
In an effort to curb drug traffic, the United States has demonstrated
a growing judicial willingness to exercise jurisdiction over stateless vessels
on the high seas. This article will focus on three issues raised by recent
statutory interpretations of section 955a of the Marihuana on the High
Seas Act' (hereinafter referred to as section 955a).
The first issue relates to the use of section 955a by courts to obtain
jurisdiction over stateless vessels suspected of transporting illegal drugs.
The second issue involves an analysis of general definitions of stateless
vessels as applied to section 955a and how this has affected the exercise of
jurisdiction. A third issue explores the consequences of denying Fourth
Amendment rights to persons aboard stateless vessels on the high seas.
The article concludes with a few observations by the writer concerning
probable trends and solutions to the constitutional and jurisdictional
problems raised by section 955a.
II. THE USE OF SECTION 955A AS A MEANS OF OBTAINING JURISDICTION
There are a number of principles by which jurisdiction over a vessel
on the high seas can be obtained.2 Those cases involving stateless vessels
most often use the protective or objective territorial principles.8 These
1. Marihuana on the High Seas Act, 21 U.S.C. § 955a-d (Supp. V 1981). Section 955a of
this Act embodies the enforcement provision; sections 955b-955d relate to definitions used
throughout the Act, offenses and punishments, and the seizure and forfeiture of property,
respectively.
2. These theories of jurisdiction are part of international customary law. For example,
the "law of the flag" theory recognizes that a vessel on the high seas is subject to the juris-
diction of the state of the flag it flies. The universality principle recognizes that some
crimes, such as piracy, are of such a universal character that any nation may participate in
their suppression. For a thorough treatment of these and other bases of jurisdiction, see N.
LEECH, C. OLIVER & J. SwEENEY, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SvSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS
891-44 (2d ed. 1980).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 653 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Piz-
zarusso, 388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1968); Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1967)
(applying objective territoriality principle); and United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F.
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principles require proof of a potential or actual effect in the nation assert-
ing jurisdiction. A nexus, or connection with the country, must be demon-
strated in order to maintain jurisdiction over the vessel.4
In stateless vessel cases, a nexus with the United States has been
established by showing an intent to distribute narcotics in the United
States. In the past, the prosecution's assertion of this intent was easily
rebutted by the defense that the drugs were not headed for American
shores.' In addition, the inadvertent repeal of a prior law had left prose-
cutors without a statutory basis for their argument." Section 955a
strengthens the prosecution's case by abrogating these traditional princi-
ples of jurisdiction and providing a long-awaited legal weapon against
smuggling.7
The scope of the statute was intended by Congress to reach acts of
possession, manufacture or distribution committed outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States.8 Furthermore, "[tihe intent element
Supp. 1340 (S.D.Fla. 1981) (applying the protective principle). See also The S.S. Lotus,
1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10 (Judgment of Sept. 7).
4. Note 3 supra.
5. H.R. REP. No. 323, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1979) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]. See
also United States v. Hayes, 653 F.2d 8 (1st. Cir. 1981).
6. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 4. The 1st Session of the 77th Congress passed a bill
making it a crime to use narcotics on United States vessels on the high seas. The subsequent
passage of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act inadvertently re-
pealed that bill; thus, what was a crime on United States territory was not a crime on a
United States vessel on the high seas. See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Con-
trol Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (pertinent sections codified in 21 U.S.C.
§§ 801-966). See also 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1275.
7. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 4, which states that:
"[A]dequate material support and sufficient minimal sanctions are necessary
to neutralize smugglers and provide a credible deterrent to smuggling through
uniformly high conviction rates in the criminal justice system. There is pres-
ently no potent legal weapon in our anti-smuggling arsenal with which to com-
bat drug offenses on the high seas."
See also Coast Guard Drug Law Enforcement: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Coast
Guard and Navigation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1979). At these hearings, Morris Bushby, counsel for the U.S. Depart-
ment of State said that "[while ordinarily the United States does not favor a unilateral
extension of jurisdiction by the United States over activities of non-U.S. citizens on board
stateless vessels withouL proof of som.e connection *- th, Un.-xd State, the Eerie, At,,re
of this problem [dictates otherwise]."
8. 21 U.S.C. § 955a[h] (Supp. V 1981). At least one court has implied that the statute
may exceed the bounds of international law by extending jurisdiction beyond territorial lim-
its. In United States v. Howard-Arias, 679 F.2d 363 (4th Cir. 1982), defendants' ship became
disabled 60 miles off the coast of Virginia where they boarded an Italian vessel. The Coast
Guard searched the disabled vessel and found a large quantity of marihuana. The defense
argued proof of a nexus was required; otherwise, the exercise of jurisdiction via section 955a
would violate international law. The court recognized the potential conflict between section
955a and international law. Instead of justifying its decision in light of international law as
the court in United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1982) had done, the
court in Howard-Arias concluded that while international law is a part of United States law,
it must give way when in conflict with a federal statute. See also The Pacquette Habana,
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may be inferred by proof of a presence of a large quantity of the narcotic,
giving rise to an inference of trafficking."9 The statute passed as recom-
mended, and section 955a now reads:
It is unlawful for any person on board a vessel of the United States,
or on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States on
the high seas, to knowingly or intentionally manufacture or distribute,
or to possess with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled
substance.' 0
Subsequent interpretations of section 955a effectuated the intent of
Congress. Courts upheld convictions absent proof of an intent to cause
any effect in the United States." At first, these interpretations were lim-
ited to United States registered vessels, 12 but United States v. Marino-
Garcia'" was a natural extension of this interpretation to stateless vessels.
In Marino-Garcia, the vessel FOUR ROSES was apprehended by the
Coast Guard DEPENDABLE on the high seas, 300 miles south of Florida
and 65 miles west of Cuba. When the DEPENDABLE approached the
FOUR ROSES and requested identification, the Coast Guard was told
that the ship's home port was Miami, Florida. The words "Miami, Flor-
ida" were also stenciled on the bow. A subsequent document check re-
vealed that the vessel was not registered in the United States but in Hon-
duras. All nine crewmen aboard the FOUR ROSES were foreign
nationals. Upon discovery of 57,000 pounds of marihuana in the hold, the
crew was indicted and subsequently convicted under section 955a."
The Marino-Garcia court rebutted the defendants' assertion that
section 955a required a showing of a nexus to the United States. Section
955a prohibits any person aboard "a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States" from possessing a controlled substance with intent to
distribute or manufacture. As the statutory definition of "vessel subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States" includes stateless vessels,' 5 the
court concluded that "the statute does not require that there be a nexus
175 U.S. 677 (1900), which held that international law is binding on the United States, and
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161 (E.D. Pa. 1980)
for the rule that United States law takes precedence over international law.
9. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 16.
10. 21 U.S.C. § 955a (Supp. V 1981).
11. The Fourth Circuit followed suit in United States v. Alonzo, 689 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.
1982). See also United States v. Riker, 670 F.2d 987 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Liles,
670 F.2d 989 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Quesada-Rosadal, 685 F.2d 1281 (11th Cir.
1982); and United States v. Stuart-Caballero, 686 F.2d 890 (11th Cir. 1982).
12. United States v. Julio-Diaz, 678 F.2d 1031 (11th Cir. 1982).
13. United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 103
S.Ct. 948 (1983).
14. Id. at 1377.
15. 21 U.S.C. § 955b(d) provides that a "'vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States includes a vessel without nationality or a vessel assimilated to a vessel with-
out a nationality, in accordance with paragraph (2) of article 6 of the [United Nations]
Convention on the High Seas, 1958."
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between stateless vessels and the U.S. but instead extends this country's
jurisdiction to all such cases." 6 Thus, "[lurisdiction exists solely as a
consequence of the vessel's status as stateless. 1 7 By dispensing with the
traditional requirement of proving a nexus, prosecution becomes easier
not only for the United States, but for all nations. A vessel's stateless
status "makes [it] subject to action by all nations proscribing certain ac-
tivities aboard stateless vessels and subjects those persons aboard to pros-
ecution for violating the proscriptions."'"
III. DEFINITIONS OF STATELESS VESSELS As APPLIED TO SECTION 955A
Once the Marino-Garcia court held that a vessel becomes subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States if it is stateless, the next issue then
became how "stateless" was to be defined.
In America, stateless vessels have often been defined as "interna-
tional pariahs [without] any recognized right to navigate freely on the
high seas."19 They are considered modern-day pirates-men and vessels
without a country. 20
The United Nations Convention on the High Seas21 provides that
"[a] ship which sails under the flags of two or more states, using them
according to convenience . . .may be assimilated to a ship without na-
tionality. '22 Furthermore, an English court has held that "[n]o question
...of any breach of international law can arise if there is no state under
whose flag the vessel sails. '23 Based on this decision and on the fact that
commentators discussing the issue have unanimously agreed that all na-
tions have the right to assert jurisdiction over stateless vessels on the high
seas,24 the Marino-Garcia court concluded that the exercise of jurisdic-
tion did not transgress recognized principles of international law.25
The expanding jurisdictional base provided by section 955a and the
generalized definition of "stateless vessel" are indications that the crime
of transporting illegal drugs by ship is being treated as a universal crime
because "any nation" can prosecute.26 This "universal crime implication"
16. United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1379 (11th Cir. 1982).
17. Id. at 1383.
18. Id.
19. See United States v. Cortes, 588 F.2d 106 (5o.i Cir. 1979) u.dUn.ted States v. May-
May, 470 F. Supp. 384 (S.D.Tex. 1979).
20. HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 3.
21. United Nations Convention on the High Seas, art. 6, para. 2, opened for signature
Apr. 29, 1958, entered into force Sept. 30, 1962, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450
U.N.T.S. 82.
22. Id. at art. 6, para. 2. "Flags of convenience" is a term of art denoting the use of
more than one flag as a means of evading the law of any given state.
23. Molvan v. Attorney-General for Palestine, 1948 A.C. 351
24. 679 F.2d at 1383. The court cites, inter alia, 9 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 21 (1968) and 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 546 (7th ed. 1948).
25. 679 F.2d at 1382.
26. Id. at 1383.
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is also supported by the recent case of United States v. Martinez." In
that case, the vessel was stateless not because of proof that it was using
flags according to convenience, but because it was not validly registered
under Honduran law, as the defendants claimed.28 The emphasis on inva-
lid registration was justified under paragraph 2 of article 6 of the Conven-
tion on the High Seas.2 9 However, this provision addresses only vessels
that use flags of convenience, without mentioning registration. This ex-
tension of the "stateless" definition clearly aids prosecution, although its
justification remains unclear."0
United States v. Knight"' further supports the pro-prosecution
stance adopted by the Marino-Garcia court. In Knight, the vessel KRIS
was apprehended on the high seas in an exclusive Mexican fishing zone.
The home port, "Brownsville, Texas", was stenciled on the stern, al-
though the captain had claimed that the vessel and crew were Colom-
bian.3 2 When the defense introduced evidence that the ship was of Pana-
manian registry, the vessel was considered stateless because it had
adopted various nationalities according to convenience. The court clearly
required that the proof of a nexus, long a thorn in the side of the prosecu-
tion, was a burden to be borne by the defense. Thus, the defense had to
show a "sufficient nexus between the KRIS and another country in order
to preclude [United States] jurisdiction."3
Cases such as Martinez and Knight illustrate the judicial willingness
to aid prosecution. In addition, the Eleventh Circuit has also indicated
that stateless vessels may not be entitled to constitutional protection.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON SEARCHES AND SEIZURES OF
STATELESS VESSELS ON THE HIGH SEAS
The United States constitutional provision most often invoked to
dismiss high seas narcotics confiscation cases is the Fourth Amendment
proscription against unreasonable search and seizures.3 4 It requires that
every search and seizure on land be based on probable cause.35 The Ninth
and Second Circuits have drawn a parallel between the search and seizure
of vessels, concluding that in both instances an "articulate and reasonable
27. 700 F.2d 1358 (11th Cir. 1983).
28. Id. at 1362. The defendants had produced an Honduran certificate upon boarding,
which was later refuted by the Honduran government.
29. United Nations Convention on the High Seas, note 21 supra.
30. A recent law review article perceives this extension as implied under international
law. See Case Comment, United States v. Marino-Garcia, 52 CIN. L. Rzv. 292 (1983). See
also United States v. Marino-Garcia: Criminal Jurisdiction Over Stateless Vessels on the
High Seas, 9 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 141 (1983).
31. 705 F.2d 432 (1983).
32. Id. at 433.
33. Id.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
35. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). This case held that a valid search of an
automobile required a "reasonable and articulable suspicion."
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suspicion""6 is required. The rationale is that the lesser expectation of
privacy on board a ship justifies a lesser standard than probable cause.
The Fifth Circuit rejected the applicability of landbased Fourth Amend-
ment requirements, holding that because seizures on the high seas were
fundamentally different from those on land due to limited enforcement
personnel,37 there was no need to show reasonable suspicion or probable
cause.
The Eleventh Circuit adopted the Fifth Circuit's standard that the
Coast Guard need not have a reasonable suspicion of an ongoing violation
in order to implement a valid seizure. 8 Stateless vessels, as well as Amer-
ican vessels, are subject to this rule. The Marino-Garcia decision indi-
cated in dicta that even if the Fourth Amendment applied, the seizure
would still be valid because, under international law, the Coast Guard has
the right to approach an unidentified vessel in order to ascertain the ves-
sel's nationality. 9 This rule was extended by providing that the Coast
Guard may subject the unidentified vessel to a seizure for the limited
purpose of a document inspection. There must be a reasonable suspicion
that the vessel is an American flagship or that the vessel is attempting to
conceal its identity. 0 However, the potential for abuse is great, as random
and subterfuge searches designed to seek evidence of a crime are covertly
authorized under the guise of administrative searches.4 In addition, the
36. In United States v. Piner, 608 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1979), a divided panel concluded
that a random inspection of an American vessel conducted at night without a reasonable
suspicion of illegal activity transgressed the Fourth Amendment. See also United States v.
Streifel, 665 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1981).
37. United States v. Shelnut, 625 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Williams,
617 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1980).
38. 679 F.2d at 1385.
39. The S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A., No. 10 (Judgment of Sept. 7); The Mariana
Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat) 1 (1826).
40. United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Rubies,
612 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 940 (1980). The Supreme Court has
recently ruled that the search and seizure of a ship located in U.S. waters providing ready
access to the open sea was valid even though there was no suspicion of wrongdoing at the
time of boarding. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez et al., -U.S.-, 103 S.Ct. 2573
(1983). In Villamonte-Marquez, a ship was boarded by customs officers pursuant to 19
U.S.C. § 1581a, which authorizes them to board any vessel at any place for a document
inspection. Marihuana was discovered in the hold, and the defendants were prosecuted
under 21 U.S.C. § 963. The gist of the Supreme Court's holding (by Justice Rehnquist) was
that, in boarding the vessel, customs officers need not suspect any wrongdoing by the crew
because "the nature of the governmental interest in assuring compliance with documenta-
tion requirements, particularly in waters where the need to deter or apprehend smugglers is
great, [and] the type of intrusion, while not minimal, is limited." 103 S.Ct. at 2582. The
dissent argued, however, that "[tioday's holding ... r[a]n roughshod over the previously
well-established principle that the police may not be issued a free commission to invade any
private premises without a requirement of probable cause, reason, suspicion or some other
limit on their discretion or abuse thereof." Id. at 2589.
41. See Nanda, Enforcement of United States Laws at Sea-Selected Jurisdictional
and Evidentiary Issues in INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL LAW: ENFORCING UNITED
STATES LAW IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY, FOURTH SOKOL COLLOQUIUM (1981).
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Marino-Garcia court's extension of the right to approach was allegedly
authorized by article 22 of the Convention on the High Seas. In invoking
this provision, however, the court misapplied it. Article 22 provides that:
[a] warship which has encountered a foreign merchant ship on the
high seas is not justified in boarding her unless there is reasonable
ground for suspecting. . . that, although flying a foreign flag or refus-
ing to show its flag, the ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as
the warship."'
The United States Coast Guard is boarding vessels on the high seas
because of a suspicion that they are stateless. The U.N. Convention re-
quires that the suspicion must be based on the fact that the ship is of the
same nationality as the state asserting jurisdiction; therefore, it does not
provide a basis in international law for denying constitutional rights.
Domestic constitutional law provides no more justification for a de-
nial of the constitutional rights of the crew of stateless vessels on the high
seas than does international law. It is an accepted principle of United
States law that the Fourth Amendment is not limited to domestic vessels
or United States citizens. "[O]nce a foreign vessel is subjected to criminal
prosecution, it is entitled to the equal protection of all laws; including the
Fourth Amendment."4 The Eleventh Circuit has interpreted this provi-
sion as encompassing foreign vessels but excluding stateless vessels, as
follows:
Without deciding the issue, we note that a number of considerations
militate against the extension of the Amendment to stateless vessels.
Stateless vessels have no right to travel freely on the high seas and are
considered a threat to the order and stability of the oceans. Since the
vessels have no rights under international law, we find it somewhat
dubious to suggest that the Founding Fathers intended to provide
these vessels with the prophylactic safeguards contained in the Fourth
Amendment."'
Indeed, the court went further and indicated that even if the Fourth
Amendment were applicable, a vessel's status as stateless might render
any search and seizure reasonable. 45 The defect in this argument is that a
vessel's status cannot be determined until boarding for a document in-
spection; yet, this prior boarding is sanctioned by a subsequent
discovery.4"
42. United Nations Convention on the High Seas, supra note 21, at art. 22, para. 1(c).
43. United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1262 (5th Cir. 1978).
44. 679 F.2d at 1384 n.21.
45. Id. at 1384.
46. A sounder approach was utilized in United States v. Barrio, 556 F. Supp. 395
(D.P.R. 1982). This case involved a stateless vessel boarded while on the high seas. The
defendant crew members' motion to suppress evidence was denied as Fourth Amendment
rights were "personal rights not to be vicariously asserted." This analysis was made in con-
formity with Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), which ruled that a person who
is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure as a result of a third person's premises or prop-
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This circular reasoning should not be the basis for denying constitu-
tional rights. The equal protection clause under the United States Consti-
tution demands that foreign persons prosecuted under United States laws
receive constitutional protection.4 7
V. CONCLUSION
In the wake of Marino-Garcia and its progeny, a clear trend can be
identified which dramatically alters the prosecution of suspected drug
smugglers on the high seas. The Eleventh Circuit has begun to treat drug
smuggling as a universal crime by expanding the jurisdictional base of
section 955a. It does so by including invalid registration within its defini-
tion of stateless vessel and also by placing the burden of showing a nexus
upon the defense. Instead of focusing on the statelessness of the vessel,
international dialogue would be encouraged by focusing on the vessel's
activities vis-h-vis drug smuggling. This would preserve the constitutional
rights afforded crews of stateless vessels under United States law, while
allowing for effective prosecution of illegal drug traffic on the high seas.
Lynda Hettich Knowles
Directed-Energy Weapons
On The "High Frontier"
I. INTRODUCTION
President Reagan recently announced the proposed development and
deployment by the U.S. of a space-based ABM system utilizing directed-
energy weapons (DEWs).1 Although the proposal provoked a variety of
intense reactions from the political and scientific communities in both the
U.S. and U.S.S.R., it failed to arouse and sustain the public concern
which might otherwise be forthcoming. The "Star Wars" quality of the
plan perhaps renders it superfluous in the minds of most.
Although doubts exist as to whether the technology necessary to im-
plement the President's proposal will ever be available, they do not war-
rant disregard of the impact which would be caused by the development
erty has not suffered any loss of Fourth Amendment rights.
47. See NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 592 (1982).
The Fourth Amendment is applied through the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires
equal protection under the law for all persons. "Aliens are persons, so they receive the pro-
tection of ... the Equal Protection Clause." See also United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d
1252, 1262 (5th Cir. 1979).
1. Reagan Proposes New Weapons, Denver Post, Mar. 24, 1983, at 1-A, col. 2.
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